

PROFILR: To Preserve Security and Services in Geosocial Networks

U. Varshini^{#1}, C. Rajendra^{*2}, V. Sreenatha sharma^{#3}

¹ Dept of CSE, ASCET, Gudur

² Dept of CSE, ASCET, Gudur

³ Dept of CSE, ASCET, Gudur

¹ varshini092@gmail.com

² srirajendra.c@gmail.com

³ villariss@gmail.com

Abstract--Money is that the most important participation reason for social networks suppliers. It really works on user profiles. Providing personal data exposes but users to important risks, as social networks are shown to leak and even sell user knowledge to third parties. There exists so a conflict. While not privacy persons could also be reluctant to use geosocial networks; while not user data the supplier and venues cannot support applications and haven't any incentive to participate. On this paper, it's proposed to require the first step toward addressing the clash between profit and privateness in geo social networks. PROFIL_R is a constitution for building Location Centric Profiles (LCPs), mixed over the profiles of consumers that have long gone to distinct areas. PROFIL_R enhance purchasers with strong protection and suppliers with rightness assurance.

Keywords— social technology, privacy, online security, password, location privacy

I. INTRODUCTION

Online social networks became a major source of personal information. Their users voluntarily reveal the personal information. Geosocial networks could be a style of social networking during which geographic services and capabilities equivalent to Geo committal to writing and geo tagging square measure alter further social dynamics. Geosocial network application is exploitation of GPS locations services to produce a social interface to the physical world. Existing systems have mainly taken 3 methods for improving user privacy in geosocial systems: 1) Introducing Uncertainty or Error into Location Knowledge 2) Relying on Trustworthy servers or Intermediaries to Use Anonymization to User Identities and Personal Knowledge 3) Hoping on Heavy-Weight Crypto Logical or Private Data Retrieval Techniques. None of them, however, has well-tried made on current application platforms. In this paper PROFIL_R build for Location Centric Profiles. LCP's receives users entered information about location to enhance the privacy and correctness of users.

The GSN provider Learns exact user location and to avoid the anonymized user. We tend to view two user correctness components: 1. Location Correctness, Users Contribute to LCPs

of Venues wherever they set. This demand is required by the recent surge of false check-ins [8], motivated by their use of economic reasons. 2. LCP correctness, users should modify LCPs only in a predefined manner. First, we tend to propose a venue centric PROFIL_R, that relieves the GSN supplier from a pricey involvement in venue specific activities. To attain this, PROFIL_R stores and construct LCPs at venues which are implemented using Benaloh's homomorphic cryptosystem. We prove that PROFIL_R satisfies the introduced correctness and privacy properties. Second, localized PROFIL_R extension designed round the snapshot LCP's.

II. LITERARY SURVEY

A. Online Social Network

Online Social Networks (OSNS) are face book and google have forwarded to the way our society communicates. Online Social Networks (OSN), users are placing more and more information about themselves on Internet. However, the personal data which users provide may be seen more than just their friends on these OSNs [9]. There has also been improving in the use of third party applications to combined user activity data on OSNs. These third party servers can show or leak user information which they provided on OSNs. Online social networks use Locker's [7], system is providing the privacy.

B. Social Networking Services:

Social Networking Services (SNS), like face book, LinkedIn, and orkut, square measure a predominant service on the net in these days. Job for a broad vary of users of all ages, and huge variations in social, instructional, and national backgrounds, they permit even users with restricted technical skills to publish personal data and communicate with ease.

C. Online social network privacy

Cutillo proposed [7], Lockr, a system that improves the privacy of centralized and localized on-line content sharing systems. Lockr offers 3 vital privacy edges to OSN users. First, it separates social networking content from all alternative practicality that OSNs offer.

This decoupling lets user's management their own social information: they can decide that OSN supplier ought to store it, that third parties ought to have access to that, or they will even prefer to manage it themselves. Such flexibility higher accommodates OSN users' privacy desires and preferences. Second, Lockr ensures that digitally signed social relationships required to access social knowledge cannot be re-used by the OSN for unwitting purposes.

Finally, Lockr allows message cryptography employing a social relationship key. A.Tootoonchian proposed Safebook, [11] distributed on-line social networks wherever insiders area unit protected from external observers through the inherent flow of data in the system.

D. Geosocial Network:

Geosocial Networking may be a kind of social networking during which geographic services and capabilities more of geo cryptography and geo tagging area unit won't to modify extra social dynamics. User-submitted location information or geo location techniques [6], will enable social networks to attach and coordinate users with native individuals or events that match their interests. Geo location on web-based social network services is IP-based or use hotspot trilateration. For mobile social networks, texted location information [5], or transportable trace will modify location-based services to complement social networking.

E. Characteristics of Geosocial Network:

Geosocial Networking permits users to speak relative to their present venue internet mapping services with geocoding information for locations (streets, buildings, and towers) will be used with geotagged data to match users Social technology is outlined as applying the used ways for explicit functions in the main social ones: to ease human process via social code and social hardware, which could concerned the good thing about computers and knowledge technology for governmental processed. It is traditionally referred to as to 2 meanings: as a word equally to social engineering, means that began within the nineteenth century, and as a procedure of social code, means that began within the past twenty first century with a location event or native cluster to socialize in or modify a bunch of users to determine on a gathering activity. Social networks are shown leak and even sell user data to 3rd party, there exists thus a

conflict whereas not user data the provider and venues cannot support applications and do not have any incentive to participate. Fashionable geosocial applications are Yelp [1], Gowalla, Face book Places and Foursquare [2], enable users to exchange their locations additionally as permissions for a locations or venues.

1. *Location-planning:* With location-planning, or social-mapping, users square measure able to search and browse near stores, restaurants, etc. User's venues square measure appointed profiles and users will rate them, share their opinions and post pictures. These networks use the situation of mobile phones to attach users and will additionally give directions to and from the venue by linking to a GPS service.

2. *Public Safety & News Media:* Most criminal investigations and news events happen in an exceedingly geographical location. Geo-social investigation tools give the flexibility to supply social media from multiple networks (such as Twitter, Flickr, and YouTube) while not the utilization of hash tags or keyword searches. Some vendors give subscription mostly based services to supply period and historical social media for events.

F. Privacy Policies

Some sites, like Face book, are scrutinized for allowing users to "tag" their friends via email whereas checking in Check-in vs. Check-out a "check-in" is a permission-based network that needs a user to join or sign on. The host is then given permission to access the user's information and to contact him or her. A "check-out" network is defaulted to own the user enclosed during a cluster. Users should take away themselves from the network if they need to not be included.

III. ACTUAL WORK

A. PROFIL_R Overview

PROFIL_R is a framework for building Location Centric Profiles (LCP's) over profiles of users. This is practically simple and general enough to be applicable to most other GSNs (e.g., Face book Places). In this model, a supplier S hosts the system, along with information concerning registered venues, and serving a number of users.

To use the provider's services, a user application, the user has to be downloaded. Users register and receive initial service credentials, together with a singular user id. The supplier supports a group of companies or venues, with associate in tend associated geographic location (e.g., restaurants, yoga categories, towing corporations, etc). Users are inspired to report their location, through check-ins at venues wherever they are presented. During check-in operation, performed upon a definite user action, the user's device retrieves its GPS coordinates, reports them to the server, who then returns a listing of close venues.

B. Location Centric Profiles

Each user surround a profile element $PU = \{PU_1, PU_2 \dots PUN\}$ consisting of values on d dimensions (e.g., age, gender, home city, etc). Each dimension encompasses a vary, or a set of doable values. Given a collection of users U at location L , the situation central profile at L , denoted by $LCP(L)$ is the set $\{LCP_1, LCP_2, \dots LCP_N\}$, wherever LCP_i denotes the aggregate statistics over the i -th dimension of profiles of users from U . The intuition behind location privacy is that users understand their location as non-public information.

1. The decentralization service setting: A Decentralization service allows its users to publish a resource (e.g., a picture, a text message, a check-in) tagged with the current location and time, as well as a set of users related to the resource. A resource is either tagged automatically or tagged manually. Since resources and their tags become available to other users as well as to service providers, we are concerned with the privacy violations that the publication can lead to. Formally, a resource r is a tuple: $\{Udata; STdata; Content\}$ where the first two elements are meta-data tags with r . U data being a set of identifiers of users, $STdata$ being a spatio temporal tag and $Content$ being the resource itself.

Fig.1 *Setup S* is going past every venue wherever user statistics are collected, to come up with parameters for user check-ins. To perform a check-in, a user initial runs *Spotter*, to prove her physical presence at the venue. *Spotter* will return error if the verification fails success otherwise. If *Spotter* is prosperous, sign on is run between the user and therefore the venue, and permits the gathering of profile data from the user.




Fig 1: system architecture

Specifically, if the user's profile price v on dimension falls inside the range, the counter, the spotter mainly implemented

with ZK-protocol (zero-knowledge) or challenge-response protocol. ZK-CTR was invented by the Fiat-Shamir that permits A to demonstrate data of a secret to B while not revealing any helpful information this secret. Incentive proof of the system are used because the basis for ZK-protocol.

C. Homomorphic Cryptosystems

We use the Benaloh cryptosystem [3], an extension of the Goldwasser-Micali [4].

It consists of three functions (K, E, D), defined as follows:

- **$KG(l)$ (Key Generation):** l , an odd whole number, could be a system parameter, noted to all or any participants, that denotes the dimensions of the input block. Choose 2 massive primes p and alphabetic character such $l | (p - 1)$ and $gcd(l, (p - 1)/l) = 1$ and $gcd(i, q - 1) = 1$. Let $n = p, q$. Select $y \in Z_n^*$, such that $y^{(p-1)(q-1)/l} \text{ mod } n \neq 1$. n and y are the public key and p and q are the private key.
- **$E(u, m)$:** Encrypt message $m \in Z_l^*$, using a randomly chosen value $u \in Z_n^*$ Output $y^l u^l \text{ mod } n$. **$D(z)$:** Decrypt cipher text z . Let $z = y^m u^l \text{ mod } n$. if $z^{(p-1)(q-1)/l} = 1$, then return $m = 0$. Otherwise, for $i = 1 \dots l$, compute $S_i = y^{-i} z \text{ mod } n$. If $S_i = 1$, return $m = i$.

Benaloh's cryptosystem is additively homomorphic: $E(u_1, m_1) E(u_2, m_2) = E(u_1 u_2, m_1 + m_2)$. We further define the re-encryption function $RE(v, E(u, m))$ to be $y^m u^l v^l = E(UV, m)$. Note that the re-encryption operate will be invoked while not information of the message m . what is more, it is potential to indicate that 2 cipher texts are the encoding of a similar plaintext, while not revealing the plaintext.

That is, given $E(u, m)$ and $E(v, m)$, reveal $w = u^{-1}v$. Then, $E(v, m) = RE(w, E(u, m))$.

1. Anonymizers: we tend to use AN anonymizer that (i) operates correctly – the output corresponds to a permutation of the input AN (ii) provides privacy an observer is unable to determine that input part corresponds to a given output element in any method higher than estimation. We tend to use Orbot, an android implementation.

2. K-Privacy: Let A denote an adversary that controls any number of venues and let C denote a challenger controlling k users. C runs *Spotter* followed by Check In at a venue V controlled by a on behalf of $i < k$ users. Let C_i denote the resulting counter set. For each $j = 1 \dots b$, an outputs $c[j]$ its guess of the value of the j -th counter of C_i . The advantage of A , $Adv(A) = |\Pr [C_i[j] = c[j] - 1 / (i + 1)]|$, defined for each $j = 1 \dots b$, is negligible.

D. Check-in

Check-in is run between user and venue and collect profile information from the user. This method assumes a true competition; United Nations agency does not run Spotter and sign up double for constant pair. Otherwise, the utilization of the signed pseudonyms provides an advantage to some method. Note that if pseudonyms do not seem to be used, this demand is not necessary. No different information is distributed by users throughout the Spotter and sign up procedures.

User square measure inspired to report their location, through check-ins at venues wherever they are present. During a entrance operation, performed upon a definite user action, the user's device retrieves its GPS coordinates, reports them to the server, who then returns a list of close venues. The device displays the venues and the user must select one as her current check-in location by Method *spotter_v* protocol, threshold secret sharing (TSS) [10].

E. Pubstate

Whenever spotter collects correct user information. Pubstate reconstruct the private key which is used to publish the details of the user. We use the points *Prot* ($P1 (args1) \dots Pn (argsn)$) to represent protocol *Prot* run between participants $P1 \dots Pn$, each with its own arguments.

F. Algorithm of Zero-Knowledge

There are three components of ZK-protocol i.e. Completeness, Soundness and Zero-knowledge.

1. The completeness property says that if the corresponding statement is true, the supporters are convinced of this true by an explicit prover.

2. The soundness property says that if the statement is fake, no cheating prover will win over the honest supporter that it is true, except with some small probability.

3. The zero-knowledge property states if the statement is true, no cheating supporter far-famed something but this true.

1. Trusty center (T) selects RSA-like modulus $n=p, q$, n -public key, p and q -private key

2. A selects s coprime to n , $1 \leq s \leq n-1$, computes $v=s^2 \pmod n$, and registers v with T, v -public, s -secret

Protocol:

1. A chooses random commitment r , $1 \leq r \leq n$

2. A sends B (1): $x = r^2 \pmod n$

3. B sends A (2): random e , $e = 0$ or $e = 1$

4. A sends B (3): $y = r \cdot se \pmod n$

And then verification method is done as

Verification:

1. B rejects if $y = 0$

2. B accepts if $y^2 = x \cdot y^e \pmod n$, rejects otherwise.

In $PROFIL_R$ the LCP'S are representing locations in geosocial networks. We find out the exact location in geosocial networks represent GSN components i.e. latitude and longitude values. These values are verifying the exact location in GSN.

Latitude is that the distance of north or south of the equator. Longitude is that the distance of east or west of the prime meridian (Greenwich, England). Latitude and line of longitude are measured in seconds, minutes, and degrees:

$$60'' (\text{seconds}) = 1' (\text{minute})$$

$$60' (\text{minutes}) = 1^\circ (\text{degree})$$

G. Latitude and Longitude

1. Mark the venues of the point(s) of discharge and also the middle of production on the map.

2. For every location, construct a little rectangle over the purpose with fine pencil lines communicate the closest 5' graticules. Graticules are intersecting of latitude and line of longitude lines that are marked on the map edge, and visual as black crosses at four points within the middle of the map.

3. Browse and record the latitude and line of longitude for the southeast corner of the little quadrangle drawn in step 2. The latitude and line of line of longitude are written at the perimeters of the map.



Fig 2: Representation of Latitude and Longitude

4. To augment the increment latitude on top of the latitude line recorded in step3 Position the map in order that you face its west edge; Place the ruler in nearly a north-south Alignment, with the "0" on the latitude line recorded in step three and also the edge corresponding crossed purpose, The calculation from the latitude line to the specified point.

$$\frac{\text{Point distance}}{\text{Total distance}} \times 150 = \text{Increment of latitude}$$

IV. CONCLUSION

PROFIL_R is also a model, provide data in securely and properly to construct for location central profiles (LCP's). During this paper LCP'S typically correct resolution to the users in line with their gift locations in Geosocial networks. Even PROFIL_R efficiently implement inside the mobile devices.

REFERENCE

- [1] Yelp, Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA. (2014, Feb.28). Available: <http://www.yelp.com>
- [2] Foursquare, New York, NY, USA Available: <https://foursquare.com/>
- [3] J. Benaloh, "Dense probabilistic encryption," in Proc. Workshop Sel. Areas Cryptograph., 1994, pp. 120–128.
- [4] S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, "Probabilistic encryption & how to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information," in Proc. 14th Annu. ACM Symp. Theory Comput. New York, NY, USA, 1982, pp. 365–377.
- [5] X. Pan, X. Meng, and J. Xu, "Distortion-based anonymity for continuous queries in location-based mobile services," in Proc. GIS, 2009, pp. 256–265.
- [6] S. Mascetti, D. Freni, C. Bettini, X. Sean Wang, and S. Jajodia, "Privacy in geo-social networks: Proximity notification with untrusted service providers and curious buddies," VLDB J., vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 541–566, Aug. 2011.
- [7] A. Tootoonchian, S. Saroiu, Y. Ganjali, and A. Wolman, "Lockr: Better privacy for social networks," in Proc. ACM CoNEXT, 2009, pp. 1–12.
- [8] Foursquare Official Blog, New York, NY, USA. (2011). On Foursquare, Cheating, and Claiming Mayorships from your Couch [Online]. Avail-able: [http://goo.gl/F1Yn5\[6\]](http://goo.gl/F1Yn5[6]) (2012).
- [9] B. Krishnamurthy and C. E. Wills, "On the leakage of personally identifiable information via online social networks," Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 112–117, 2010.
- [10] A. Shamir, "How to share a secret," *Commun. ACM*, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612–613, 1979.
- [11] Cutillo, R. Molva, and T. Strufe, "Safebook: Feasibility of transitive cooperation for privacy on a decentralized social network," in Proc. IEEE WOWMOM, Jun. 2009, pp. 1–6.

Selected Paper from International Conference on Computing (NECICC-2k15)